Telecommunications are considered to be an important engine for the economy as a whole, having a large impact on effi ciency in nearly all economic sectors and, therefore, greatly infl uencing GDP performance.
Consequently, big debates on the possibility of building the so-called Next Generation Network -a multi-service, very high speed, IP-based network -are still under way in many countries.
The recently approved Directive 2009/140/EC 1 expressly aims "to give appropriate incentives for investment in highspeed networks", as these networks are considered fundamental in order to "support innovation in content-rich internet services and strengthen the international competitiveness of the European Union". At the same time, the text specifi es that the development of these new networks has to be promoted "while safeguarding competition and boosting consumer choice". This means that the goal of NGN 2 investment promotion should simply be added to the old objectives without explicitly specifying a priority order. But investment incentives are not always in line with the objective of promoting competition, and the discussions over which of the two objectives should prevail have been very heated: an example here is the German debate over a "regulatory holiday", which implicitly assumes that investment stimulus must take priority over the promotion of competition, while the European Commission stresses the im-
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Finally, the last condition is a prerequisite for any active incentive policy: if such investments are not crucial for a country, why should they be supported at a level higher than the one fi xed by the market? The telecommunications sector has a strong impact on the entire economy, positively affecting the effi ciency of fi rms and of public administration, not to mention its impact on the lifestyle of individuals, but we must ask ourselves if it is really necessary to create a new NGN to reach such objectives or whether the existing network is suffi cient (perhaps with some less expensive innovation/maintenance activity).
In order to answer this question, we have to analyse the circumstances of networks in each particular country carefully. In other words, a real need to defi ne incentives to speed up the creation of the new network comes only if the existing network is unlikely to bear (from a quantitative and qualitative point of view) the impact of the foreseen increase in broadband demand with ordinary maintenance activity alone. Obviously the likelihood of such a negative event has to be carefully evaluated since if the existing network reveals itself to be insuffi cient, the risk is a nearly complete paralysis of the country, a danger which is not acceptable and must be accounted for. • the core part of the network (optical capacity in the backbone, connectivity and core switching capacity) will have no problems; • the demand for Internet and IP services will grow exponentially after 2010; • investments in the access network will progress linearly (or less than linearly).
If Figure 1 is correct, the current access network will not be adequate in the future, thus creating a problem of bandwidth insuffi ciency.
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In the medium term, there are other qualitative parameters negatively infl uencing the ability of the current copper access network to handle the increasing demand. These include:
• an increased fault rate with the increase of broadband supply; environment, industrial policy has to intervene to create it, whereas if the environment is already favourable, regulation must assure that it can act optimally.
Excluding the digital divide areas (market failure areas) from the debate, Next Generation Networks -with focus on the access component -will:
• be realised in areas which are or can become profi table;
• be able to supply more innovative services, which probably will give a higher ARPU 5 than the current ones; • allow considerable savings of operating costs (less maintenance, greatly reduced number of sites, etc.).
As a consequence, why should we worry about the idea of incentivising (or not disincentivising) these investments?
As a general rule, investments should be tied to market rules: if the market exists, someone will invest. The need for an incentive, then, arises only when the following conditions are present:
• the investments have very long payback periods;
• future demand is uncertain;
• the current competition level is not strong enough to push innovative investments; • the investments are considered to be a need for the country.
Looking into these requirements in more depth, we observe that the fi rst two conditions are structurally present in the case of NGN built (at least in part) with fi bre, as it requires extremely high investments and the level of demand for innovative services is not really predictable (no "killer application" has emerged thus far), while the last two conditions can vary in different countries.
As for the third condition, we observe that if the access segment is already competitive (e.g. cable TV operators are also quite strong in the telecommunications market), it is likely that the telecoms access operator will be motivated to complete its own Next Generation Access (NGA) to reduce the risk of being overtaken by a competitor using coaxial cable, which often performs better than copper line. This is exactly the conclusion reached in the report commissioned by the UK government and published in September 2008 6 , whose main recommendation is to wait and see before introducing public incentives, as it is likely that British Telecom will carry out the investments itself even in the absence of incentives.
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that are available to governments (or other public bodies). We will then concentrate on the regulatory measures able to support (not to discourage) investment. In both cases, our main question remains how to incentivise (or avoid disincentivising) investments without retreating from supporting competition and consumer choice.
Viable Incentive Models
In the past, the current copper telecommunication network was achieved mainly (if not entirely) with public funds, generally through the public property of the monopolist operator. This means that public funds were directed towards an activity considered to have social relevance but without any negative impact on competitors, as the TLC industry was a monopoly. Furthermore, these public payments were not without a return, as the company receiving funds and building the infrastructure contextually increased its value, thus also increasing the value of the public participation in the company.
Nowadays, however, the market is competitive. Therefore, any public contribution to a single operator in the absence of appropriate guarantees and procedures would represent a transfer of public money for the main benefi t of the company's shareholders and, as such, would be considered a state aid and would be subject to sanctions under European law. Therefore, it is crucial to identify a viable incentive model that is respectful of public interest and competition.
The possible incentive schemes differ in many ways. Table  1 attempts to group them according to their impact (supply or demand), type of transfer (direct/indirect) and instrument chosen. This paper does not examine the issue of demand incentives. They are important and effective but, given the large investments required by an NGN, demand incentives would not be suffi cient. In the situation described above, direct supply incentives are needed. Viable incentive schemes include:
• non-refundable public funds -this type of intervention must ensure that all the companies operate on a level playing-fi eld (i.e. it must be compatible with the general EU prohibition of state aid) and also poses the problem of politically justifying the funds transfer to a specifi c activity, which is currently unappealing to the general population; • facilitated loans -this solution minimises the political problems, but it requires a clear defi nition of the requirements to enter the scheme in order to make the procedure competitive;
• reduced bandwidth availability in relation to the length of access copper line to reach the customer; • higher interference with increased customer density; • obsolescence; • quality instability in some areas related to weather conditions.
To sum up, positive incentives for building a new Next Generation Network are only needed when there is a risk that the old network will not bear the increase of broadband demand or when there are no or few incentives for private operators to invest on their own.
These two conditions will be present in only a few countries, while private investors can often fi nd adequate stimuli for creating the infrastructure by themselves. Thus, in the latter situation the issue is not about fi nding a way to incentivise network creation but rather about using industrial and regulatory policy to create an environment which does not discourage such creation.
In the remainder of this paper, we concentrate on the case of a country (or part of it) where the two conditions mentioned above are currently met, which is the only situation in which positive incentives can be asked for. In particular, we assume that the absence of incentives for private operators becomes relevant when the risk of broadband insuffi ciency can only be overcome by building a new fi bre network.
How to Stimulate Investment While Maintaining a Competitive Market
In order to better answer this question, we will begin by analysing the possible incentives for NGN implementation Table 2 shows the main options of the model.
Looking into the pros and cons of the different options, granting public incentives to a company created by the vertical separation of the incumbent's entire network (both copper and fi bre) has the following positive elements:
• it maximises the synergies and effi ciencies of investment, management and migration from copper to fi bre; • it guarantees more stable and predictable cash fl ow from the beginning; • once started, the process is less complex.
On the other hand, we note the following negative features:
• high complexity in the initial defi nition and implementation; • higher initial investments compared to other options.
As for the second option -the creation of a new company exclusively for the fi bre network (regardless of whether it was created through the vertical separation of the incumbent fi bre network) -we observe some positive elements:
• less need for public investment;
• no need to touch the incumbent traditional network.
• a public-private partnership (PPP) -generally, this involves the allotment of a company equity share to a public body; this solution minimises the political problem of justifying the support (if the activity is profi table   9 , the taxpayers will get an economic return), and the risk of incurring sanctions for granting state aid is also reduced, though caution here is still necessary.
Fibre NGA has some natural monopoly features, as the investment is too large to be borne by more than one operator. Additionally, in many countries there is a single operator -the former monopolist -who can benefi t from relevant synergies in building the new NGA through the exploitation of the already existing ducts. Therefore, only one network can be fi nanced in each area, and in an attempt to avoid state aid problems, we must either adopt multi-operator initiatives (which encourage the participation of different operators in the NGA implementation) or split the territory 9 Obviously, there would be problems if the activity proved to be not profi table. 
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• the return on the fi bre investment is less certain due to the competition from the copper network; nevertheless, due to the reduced dimensions of the network company in this situation, it is likely to have fewer confl icts of interest with the incumbent than in the previous solution; • the problem of migrating competitors from copper LLU to analogue wholesale services on fi bre (supplier changes could be necessary); • the need for stringent regulatory rules. Therefore, the viable options previously described can be synthetically evaluated as follows:
If public funds are awarded to only one company under a national approach, then it is necessary to open the capital to other investors (public property could also be foreseen) to avoid state aid problems. If a local approach is chosen, it is also possible to adopt an auction mechanism in each local area.
In addition, in order to preserve competition and consumer choice, all operators supplying services on the market must have access to the new network. The access segment of the network has natural monopoly characteristics, and thus competition at the service level is not possible if access is not available to all on equal terms. On the other hand, in order not to discourage investments in the new network, it will be necessary to fi ne-tune wholesale tariffs in order to get a On the other hand, we see a number of negative outcomes:
• a considerable measure of synergies would be lost due to a lack of joint operational management of the copper and fi bre networks; furthermore, the re-use of the existing ducts would not be granted (this should be imposed by regulation, which is more complex than authorisation granted from within the same company); • less certainty of a return on the fi bre investment due to the competition from the copper network. In particular, there can be an important confl ict of interest if the incumbent becomes a shareholder of the new company; • the problem of migrating competitors from copper local loop unbundling (LLU) to analogue wholesale services on fi bre (supplier changes could be necessary); • the need for more stringent regulatory rules.
Finally, adopting a local approach to the fi bre network creation (regardless of whether or not it was created via the horizontal separation of the incumbent network) will lead to positive outcomes such as:
• a reduced need for public investments and a greater chance to graduate them over time; • a higher possibility of involving local authorities; • less operational complexity.
On the negative side, a local approach is likely to result in:
• the loss of a considerable measure of synergies due to a lack of joint operational management of the copper and fi bre networks; furthermore, re-use of ducts would not be granted (again, this should be imposed by regulation, which is more complex than authorisation granted from within the same company); 
The current trend in favour of a B&K model, in which every operator bears the costs of terminating the call on its own network, would make it more diffi cult to apply a higher rate of return on new NGA networks, as a share of the current wholesale revenues would be erased, thus comparatively favouring old, non-capillary networks. Therefore, if a regulatory incentive policy for NGA has to be adopted, an intermediate scenario such as a B&K without any constraint on quality and premium tariffs for better quality should probably be adopted.
14 Another regulatory issue relates to the defi nition of the retail prices for the services included in the Universal Service Obligations. If the new network is to substitute for the current one, should universal service users pay more for the same service? 15 Or should we cross-subsidise these services with higher prices to obtain more advanced services? How should possible cross-subsidisation in a competitive context be managed? Nowadays, this topic seems to be the least explored in both theoretical and applied works.
Last but not least, a very important regulatory issue concerns the period of migration from the current network to the new one. The contemporaneous presence of both networks has many serious drawbacks, both for the company making the investment and for its competitors.
Regarding the fi rst aspect, if we adopt a model in which the new fi bre network is built by a different company than the one that owns the copper network (either totally different shareholders or shareholders that only partially overlap), it is likely that the copper network will compete with the new network, thus making it more diffi cult for the new company to recover its investment. This type of competition can be particularly effective, as the fi xed costs of the copper network are more or less written off, and in the short to medium term it will be possible to deliver the majority of services on both networks.
The situation could be even worse if the copper company is allowed to build its own fi bre network (in competition with the new investors), with the likely result that the new company would face fi erce competition in profi table areas. This competition would make it more diffi cult to recover its investment and to build the new network in less affl uent areas.
Moreover, amongst the competition problems arising during the migration, the available wholesale products represent a 14 See E. G a l l o : Is There a "Right" Charging Principle with the NGN Advent?, in: Communications & Strategies, Vol. 1, No. 72, 2008. 15 This assumes that the new network will be more expensive in the short term (although this hypothesis has yet to be verifi ed). According to the most astute analysis, the new network will have more depreciation than the old one but lower operating costs, which will probably result in higher costs in the short to medium term.
fair rate of return on capital. Regulation must be able to reconcile these two aspects, as will be further discussed below.
Other problems will also arise during the migration period from the current copper network to the new one (e.g. the problem of competition from the old network, which can provide the same services up to a certain amount of bandwidth). Solutions to these problems must be considered in regulators' agendas.
The Role of Regulation
The role of regulation seems to be easier to discuss, as both the European 2002 regulatory package 11 and the recently approved one are based on clear and technologically neutral principles, implying that a network change is not going to weaken the regulatory pillars. But as detailed above, some non-trivial implementation issues remain to be solved.
A fi rst issue relates to the defi nition of a "right" rate of return for a network which implies high and risky investments in the short term with a long recovery plan. To preserve competition and consumer choice, the access network must be open to all; therefore, it is necessary to determine a fair price for wholesale services. This price needs to be fi xed at a level that is not too low, in order not to deter investments in the new network, but also not too high, in order to avoid excessive prices for consumers.
Obviously, the path for setting a price that complies with such confl icting characteristics is very narrow, and a number of studies have investigated the matter. In general, there is agreement among all the operators (with and without infrastructures) that a higher rate of return can be awarded for NGA investments (higher than for investments in the current copper network) 12 , and in setting the level of return, the requisite large sunk investments along with the signifi cant demand side risk must be taken into consideration.
Another issue, highly related to the previous one 13 , is the choice of the charging principle for IP interconnection. The contemporaneous presence of data and voice networks, the increasing possibility of supplying services on both networks and the trend towards a sole multi-service network will make it infeasible to maintain a double regime for interconnection: the Calling Party Network Pays (CPNP) principle, typical for voice interconnection, and the Bill & Keep (B&K) principle, used for Internet peering. serious issue, as it is necessary to defi ne the last step of the ladder of investments or, in other words, which service will take the place of the unbundling of the local loop used now. In particular, co-location will be a crucial matter to be solved, as the new network will require fewer sites than the copper one (this feature is one of the main causes of the envisioned operational cost savings versus the copper network). As competitors have invested large amounts in site preparation and regulation had pushed towards scaling the ladder of investments, we can imagine that competitors will resist closing current co-located sites in order to open new ones in the new network, thus increasing the problem of competition between the old and the new networks. The issue of stranded costs would likely arise.
Conclusions
The paper states that NGN investments require direct public incentives only when there is both the need to speed up NGN and no or few incentives exist for private operators to invest on their own.
If neither condition is met, which is probably the general case, the market will provide for the development of Next Generation Networks by itself. In this situation, our basic question (how to stimulate investments without hampering competition) can simply be answered through regulation, the main components of which would be:
• to safeguard competition guaranteeing equality of access;
• not to deter investments, for example by setting wholesale rates to guarantee a return on investment that is able to take the additional risk into account; • to choose the appropriate pricing criteria and carefully manage the migration period.
On the other hand, if the two initial conditions are met and a direct public investment is therefore deemed necessary, it is important that the chosen model avoid state aid problems, which are particularly serious given that building the fibre NGA is considered to be a natural monopoly. If a national approach is adopted, the new fi bre company can avoid state aid problems by opening the capital share to other investors. Public-private partnerships could be foreseen here. If a local approach is chosen, the possibility of adopting an auction mechanism in each local area can be added to the previous solution. In order to preserve competition (and customer choice), the new fi bre company must grant access to the new network to all operators in the market.
As a general rule, we would prefer a model able to create profi t for the administration (PPP or loans) in order to ensure that public funds are not used for the primary benefi t of companies' shareholders.
